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Barış Arı*1and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis 
Conflict Fragmentation Index 
Abstract: It is widely accepted that fragmentation influences conflict processes in a profound 
way. Multi-party conflicts with several fronts are notoriously hard to resolve. However, there 
is no easily computable measure to approximate conflict fragmentation. In this article, we 
introduce the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI), which is computed by adapting the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. The CFI considers the relative prominence of each dyadic-level 
conflict-fronts nested in the entire civil war. The relative prominence is approximated by using 
available information on conflict casualties. The CFI is time-variant and highly sensitive to 
battlefield dynamics. The flexibility of CFI can bring several advantages. Most notably, it is 
possible to calculate monthly or even daily measures of conflict fragmentation by taking 
state-based (government vs NSA) as well as non-state based (NSA vs NSA) conflicts into 
account. Overall, the CFI provides a theoretically-informed and easy to compute measure to 
approximate conflict fragmentation.  
Keywords: civil war, fragmentation, splintering, conflict duration 
1 Introduction 
Recent research on civil wars has moved beyond conceptualizations of conflict processes as 
two-party interactions between a state and a unitary challenger (Cunningham, 2006; 
Cunningham, et al., 2009; Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012). Disaggregated conflict studies 
highlighted the complexities arising from combatant fragmentation. Several researchers have 
argued that fragmented conflicts are harder to resolve, tend to last longer and are more likely 
to recur (Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham, et al., 2012; Cunningham, 2013; Rudloff & Findley, 
2016).  
Although fragmentation has been widely acknowledged as an important component of 
conflict processes, it is a challenge to conceptualize and measure it. Even when we rely on 
multi-dimensional definitions of fragmentation (see Bakke, et al., 2012), disaggregated 
information on constitutive dimensions is rarely available. As a result, the total number of 
actors involved in a conflict is often used as a crude proxy, especially when the interest is to 
control for the effects of fragmentation (e.g. Ruggeri, et al., 2012; Hultman, et al., 2014). 
In this article, we propose an alternative measure, the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI), 
which takes the number of causalities in conflict-fronts into account. The CFI is computed by 
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adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which was originally proposed to measure 
the market fragmentation, and has been widely adapted in social science ever since, including 
by the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI). Conceptually, we replace the market share of a 
company in the HHI formula by the proportion of casualties in a conflict-front to the total 
number of casualties in the whole conflict. In practical terms, the CFI is easily computable by 
relying only on the UCDP Data Family (Allansson, et al., 2017). The conflict-front is 
operationalized as the dyadic conflict between Actor A and Actor B, and the casualty data can 
be approximated by using the Battle Related Deaths dataset.  
The remaining of the article briefly discusses ways of conceptualizing conflict 
fragmentation and introduces the CFI.  We present an empirical application by analyzing civil 
conflict duration and highlight the limitations of the CFI in our concluding remarks.  
2 Conceptualizing Conflict Fragmentation 
Data advances allowed researchers to approximate conflict fragmentation by looking at the 
number of rebel groups and by distinguishing actors emerging through splintering.2  When 
fragmentation is conceptualized as actor splintering it primarily refers to fission; an entity 
disintegrates into some of its components (Findley & Rudloff, 2012; Rudloff & Findley, 2016). 
Rebel-groups often emerge by breaking apart from another organization. However, 
splintering is not the only source for fragmentation. Multiple entities can emerge 
independently from each other during a conflict process. For example, rather than an 
“original”3 organization breaking apart into splinter groups, several rebel organizations were 
independently formed in Colombia in the 1960s.  
The dyadic approach to civil wars, which opens the black-box category of “the rebels” to 
disaggregate NSAs, still uses the “unitary actor” assumption (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012). 
Yet, actors are never unitary and they vary in terms of their level of coherence. The concept 
of fragmentation, ideally, should also capture the internal coherence of actors by looking 
beyond the number of NSAs and splintering.  Bakke et al. (2012) propose the most 
comprehensive conceptualization of fragmentation by identifying three dimensions; “(1) the 
number of organizations in a movement; (2) the degree of institutionalization across these 
organizations; and (3) the distribution of power among them”. Bakke et al. (2012) focus 
primarily on ethno-political movements but their approach is transferable to civil conflict 
processes in general.  
Although we agree with Bakke et al. (2012) that information on all three dimensions of 
fragmentation is desirable, such information is rarely available. Measuring the degree of 
institutionalization and the distribution of power might not be possible for many cases. While 
                                                      
2 The UCDP Data Family can be used for these purposes (e.g. Rudloff & Findley, 2016; see Allansson, 
et al., 2017 for the UCDP).  
3 Cunningham (2006) uses the terms original groups and splinter factions to distinguish multiple actors 
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the multidimensional approach aims to relax the “unitary actor” assumption by looking 
beyond concrete entities in a conflict, it might be inevitable to require strong assumptions 
defining what constitutes  a unit of analysis; for example, an ethno-political movement 
consisting of multiple identities and cross-cutting cleavages. In the next section, we use 
available data to approximate important dimensions of conflict fragmentation.  
3 Building the Conflict Fragmentation Index 
We start with the premise that the distribution of combat activity among conflict-parties is a 
relevant measure to proxy fragmentation. Civil wars may have core actors responsible for 
most of the fighting, and tangential groups that marginally take part in the conflict. The total 
number of actors being equal, a conflict is less fragmented if most of the fighting is 
concentrated between particular actors, compared to conflicts that have the fighting more 
equally dispersed across conflict-parties. Therefore, depending on the concentration of 
combat activity, conflicts with equal number of actors can have different levels of 
fragmentation. To use the fragmentation through splintering as an example, if an NSA divides 
into two equally prominent entities, then fragmentation should increase more than a 
situation in which a relatively small component of the NSA disintegrates to form a new entity. 
Based on this conjecture, we propose the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI), which is 
constructed by adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Conceptually, the CFI takes the 
information on the prominence of conflict-fronts into account, and is calculated by the 
following formula;  
𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 1 − ∑(𝑠𝑖
2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑠𝑖 is the relative prominence of a conflict-front. It can be approximated as; 
𝑠𝑖 =  
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑦𝑎𝑑 𝑖 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
The underlying idea is that, a conflict can have many battlegrounds that their relevance 
varies across cases and time. We can operationalize a conflict-frontline as a dyadic conflict 
between Actor A and Actor B. In this sense, a conflict-frontline does not refer to a geographical 
space but a dyad. To approximate the relative prominence of a conflict-frontline, we can use 
information on the battle related deaths. If the fighting intensity is concentrated on a front, 
then that battle zone is more prominent compared to other fronts. 
Using the CFI to proxy conflict fragmentation brings several advantages. Most 
importantly, the CFI can be easily computed by relying only on the UCDP Data Family. No 
additional information apart from the conflict intensity is needed. Second, the measure is 
time-variant and highly sensitive to changes in the battlefield dynamics. Third, it allows 
researchers to consider in-fighting between NSAs as conflict fragmentation. For example, it 
can be argued that a conflict is more fragmented if NSAs fight with each other compared to a 
conflict where fighting only takes place between government forces and NSAs. 
It is possible to replace the battle related deaths in the CFI formula by an alternative 
measure. For example, Butcher (2015) also adapts the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index to 
compute concentration of military capabilities across actors within a conflict. Butcher’s (2015) 
Fractionalization measure plugs-in number of troops instead of battle-related deaths; yet, we 
maintain that causalities in a conflict is the most appropriate measure for conflict 
fragmentation. Causalities capture how the conflict activity is dispersed among actors in a 
dynamic manner. As such, the CFI can account for complexities of conflict behavior of multiple 
actors by requiring minimal information on conflict intensity of dyads.  
Figure 1 illustrates this point. The UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) is used to 
calculate the CFI scores (Croicu & Sundberg, 2017). We first limit GED to two types of conflicts; 
(1) government vs NSA and (2) NSA vs NSA. The GED considers non-state conflicts (type 2, 
according to GED) strictly separate from state-based conflicts (type 1, which includes civil 
wars). However, it can be argued that most NSA vs NSA conflicts are nested in state-based 
conflicts. For such conflicts, if at least one of the NSA is not part of more than one state-based 
conflict, non-state conflict is assumed to be nested in the state-based conflict.4 This approach 
allows us to consider NSA vs NSA fighting as a factor increasing conflict fragmentation.  
As shown in the cases of Pakistan and Afghanistan, high numbers of rebel groups do not 
necessarily translate into a high value for the CFI. Pakistan has the highest number of dyads 
nested in a conflict (10) in all of the GED but its CFI is below the median of fragmented 
conflicts. Similarly, Afghanistan has many active fronts but most of the fighting has been 
concentrated between government forces and the Taliban since the mid-2000s. Sudan has 
large fluctuations in the CFI score regardless of conflict intensity whereas Israel-Palestine 
conflict has a consistently large CFI score despite fluctuations in conflict intensity. 
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Figure 1: Black line shows the CFI score and dotted blue line shows the total number of battle 
deaths. How many dyads are nested in the conflict is superimposed on each CFI score. 
3 Fragmentation and Conflict Duration 
We demonstrate the applicability of the CFI by looking at civil conflict duration. It has been 
widely accepted that fragmented civil wars are harder to resolve because they involve more 
veto players (Cunningham, 2006). Instead of measuring the number of veto players, we will 
plug in the CFI. To get more conservative estimates, we use the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths 
Dataset (Allansson, et al., 2017), which only includes data on state-based “active”5 conflicts.6 
For data on conflict duration, we use the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2-2015  
(Kreutz, 2010). 
We control for a series of possible 
confounding variables. First, we control for 
the incompatibility; whether the conflict is 
over governmental or territorial control. 
Data on population and GDP p.c. are taken 
from Gleditsch (2002). Incentives to acquire 
access to natural resources can prolong 
conflict. Data on natural resources is taken 
from (Buhaug, et al., 2009). Coups are coded 
following (Thyne, 2015). Data on mediation 
is taken from DeRouen, et al. (2011) and Ari 
(2017). Whether an NSA receives support 
from an external patron or not is coded 
following Cunningham, et al. (2009).  
We estimate two Cox Proportional 
Hazard models. Results are presented in 
Table 1. As we report coefficients, a negative 
term indicates a decrease in the hazard rate, 
which implies longer conflicts. A positive 
term, on the other hand, indicates alleviation 
in the hazard rate, meaning shorter conflicts. 
CFI is associated with a significant decrease 
in the hazard rate. Therefore, higher the 
fragmentation, longer the conflict. Figure 2 
illustrates this pattern. When we plug-in the 
median value for CFI (approximately 0.4), the 
estimated survival rate is considerably higher compared to no fragmentation.  
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according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset definition.   
6 Calculating the CFI by using the GED, as done in Figure 1, yields to a stronger association for models 
1 and 2 (Table 1).  
  
Figure 2: Survival Estimates with different CFI values 
Conclusion: Limitations and Further Research 
Although the CFI provides a theoretically informed way of measuring conflict fragmentation 
by using widely accessible data, it cannot capture the coherence of conflict-parties. This is an 
important limitation because the actor coherence is a central dimension of fragmentation 
(Bakke, et al., 2012). As a result, the CFI can measure fragmentation only after it happens. 
Measuring the coherence of actors and their tendency to further fragment, the causes of 
fragmentation in a sense, would be extremely useful, especially when the interest is to make 
predictions on a conflict process (Seymour, et al., 2016).  
Second, the strength of CFI to capture changes in conflict intensity to estimate 
fragmentation in a temporally informed manner can also be a weakness. Since the CFI uses 
information on battle related deaths, it might be vulnerable to fluctuations in the conflict 
intensity patterns. The CFI might be most vulnerable when the variance of conflict intensity 
is high.  Moreover, data on causalities might have a higher measurement error when a conflict 
is extremely fragmented. For example, the UCDP did not publish data on the Syrian civil war 
because of its highly fragmented nature. Further developing the CFI to incorporate the 
information on the variance of conflict-intensity across time can be beneficial to improve 
measurements of fragmentation. Future studies might prefer to decrease the variance in the 
CFI by using exponential smoothing or a moving average instead of raw calculations.  Finally, 
the CFI is undefined when the total number of deaths is 0 in a conflict.7 This is not an issue 
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If the total deaths is zero, then the CFI is undefined.  
when the sample includes only ongoing conflicts, but it is problematic if the sample is a mix 
of both conflict and peace periods since the CFI requires casualties to measure fragmentation. 
Despite these limitations, we argue that the CFI is theoretically and empirically an 
improvement to alternative readily-available measures, such as number of rebel groups. As 
such, the CFI might perform better in approximating the data generation process.  Finally, the 
flexibility of CFI makes it possible to calculate monthly or even daily measures for conflict 
fragmentation by taking state-based (government vs NSA) as well as non-state based (NSA vs 
NSA) conflicts into account. 
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